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INTRODUCTION 
Privacy law is in a bit of a pickle thanks to our love of the Fair Infor-
mation Practices (“FIPs”).  The FIPs are the set of aspirational principles 
developed over the past fifty years used to model rules for responsible data 
practices.  Thanks to the FIPs, data protection regimes around the world re-
quire those collecting and using personal information to be accountable, 
prudent, and transparent.  They give data subjects control over their infor-
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mation by bestowing rights of correction and deletion.  While the FIPs have 
been remarkably useful, they have painted us into a corner.1 
A sea change is afoot in the relationship between privacy and technol-
ogy.  FIPs-based regimes were relatively well-equipped for the first wave of 
personal computing.  But automated technologies and exponentially greater 
amounts of data have pushed FIPs principles like data minimization, trans-
parency, choice, and access to the limit.  Advances in robotics, genetics, bi-
ometrics, and algorithmic decisionmaking are challenging the idea that rules 
meant to ensure fair aggregation of personal information in databases are 
sufficient.  Control over information in databases isn’t even the half of it 
anymore.  The mass connectivity of the “Internet of Things” and near ubiq-
uity of mobile devices make the security and surveillance risks presented by 
the isolated computer terminals and random CCTV cameras of the ‘80s and 
‘90s seem quaint. 
But we’ve come too far with the FIPs to turn back now.  The FIPs 
model of privacy regulation has been adopted by nearly every country in the 
world that has decided to take data protection seriously.2  Normatively, the 
FIPs have been with us so long that in many ways they have become syn-
                                                          
 1.  See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 341, 342 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006); 
Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of Global 
Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1218–19 (2013) (arguing that even updated versions of the 
FIPs fail to update the definition of personal data, exacerbate the problematic central role of con-
sent,  remain rooted on a linear approach to data processing, and problematically continue to view 
information as “residing” in a jurisdiction); see also DANIEL J. WEITZNER ET AL., COMPUTER 
SCIENCE AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LABORATORY, MIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-034 TECHNICAL 
REPORT: INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY (2007); Lisa M. Austin, Enough About Me: Why Pri-
vacy Is About Power, Not Consent (or Harm), in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY: WHAT LAW CAN 
AND SHOULD DO? 131, 132–33 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards 
for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 499–500 (1995) 
(“[I]nstead of minimizing the manipulation of citizens and their thinking through unfettered flows 
of information, the private sector has established a ‘smoke screen’ that in effect enables subtle, yet 
significant, manipulation of citizens through hidden control of personal information.”); Mark 
MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6 ISJLP 425, 
489 (2011).  But see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1609, 1670–71 (1999); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Pri-
vacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1; Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s 
Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices, 
2000 WIS. L. REV. 743, 745 (“I propose an approach to Internet privacy centered around fair in-
formation practices (FIPs), which are rules for the fair treatment of personal information.”); Paula 
Bruening, Rethink Privacy 2.0 and Fair Information Practice Principles: A Common Language 
for Privacy, POLICY@INTEL (Oct. 19, 2014), http://blogs.intel.com/policy/2014/10/19/rethink-
privacy-2-0-fair-information-practice-principles-common-language-privacy/.   
 2.  See, e.g., COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 12 (2006); GRAHAM GREENLEAF, ASIAN DATA 
PRIVACY LAWS: TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES 6–7 (2014).  See generally 
CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND 
REGULATION (2d ed. 2007). 
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onymous with privacy.  At this point, abandoning the FIPs is out of the 
question.  Even tinkering with them requires true urgency and a good plan.  
But modern privacy problems require more than just the FIPs.  Hence, the 
pickle. 
The coming evolution of privacy risks presents an opportune moment 
to assess the state of the FIPs in the modern world and ask whether they are 
up to the task.  This Essay is an attempt to identify the practical virtues and 
vices of the FIPs to help privacy law evolve while retaining traditional no-
tions of data accountability.  The thesis of this Essay is that while we cannot 
do without the FIPs, it is time for lawmakers to stake out new ground.  The 
FIPs are necessary, but not sufficient.  To make privacy law whole, the FIPs 
must be treated as one of several frameworks to protect our personal infor-
mation. 
My argument proceeds in three parts.  I begin by analyzing why the 
FIPs have proven so resilient.  These simple principles have come a long 
way from that report issued by the Advisory Committee on Automated Per-
sonal Data Systems in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 
1973.3  Now they are synonymous with data protection all over the world.  
Europe’s insistence on adequate privacy laws for international data ex-
changes has ensured that the rest of the data-creating world will implement 
some version or aspect of the FIPs.4 
In Part I, I argue that in many ways, this is good.  The FIPs provide a 
common set of values, which is necessary as data flows from one country to 
another at the speed of light.  The FIPs provide a benchmark for industry, 
advocates, and policymakers to analyze new technologies.  Privacy as a 
general concept is vague and messy.  But the FIPs are a little more concrete.  
This clarity gives everyone a more useful litmus test for determining 
whether companies are being responsible with people’s data.  In short, the 
FIPs are invaluable for the modern world. 
In Part II, I tackle the shortcomings of the FIPs.  First, the FIPs have 
several blind spots.  The FIPs are largely focused on data aggregation by 
industry.  They do not contemplate peoples’ vulnerabilities to each other on 
platforms like social media, peoples’ susceptibility to manipulation, and 
peoples’ helplessness to automated decisionmaking.  New technologies and 
practices such as “big data” and artificial intelligence don’t fit well with the 
FIPs, which were designed to address relatively simple data processing 
                                                          
 3. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, No. (OS)73-94, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND 
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973) [hereinafter RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS].  
 4.  See GREENLEAF, supra note 2, at 7; Christopher Wolf, Delusions of Adequacy? Examin-
ing the Case for Finding the United States Adequate for Cross-Border EU-U.S. Data Transfers, 
43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 227, 231 (2013).  
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problems like unauthorized disclosure and inaccurate data.  Some of the 
FIPs, like data minimization, are seen as anathema by those that see the 
promise of big data.5  Advocates of big data argue that the true potential of 
these new technologies will be revealed when there is more information, 
not less.  Meanwhile, problems like racial bias and discrimination in algo-
rithmic systems and interposal privacy issues on social media are blind 
spots for the FIPs.6  More are looming.  Anthropomorphized robots, fMRIs 
that measure brain activity, and advances in genetics raise problems like 
susceptibility to things that look human, the inability to hide thoughts, and 
discrimination based on predictions of things that haven’t even happened 
yet.7  These problems are beyond the scope of the FIPs. 
Next, I argue that the FIPs-regimes ignore the fact that data subjects 
have limited cognitive and practical resources to draw upon to ensure their 
data is protected.  I call this the “bandwidth problem.”  Laws based on the 
FIPs like Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and Can-
ada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(“PIPEDA”) ostensibly give people control over how their information is 
                                                          
 5.  Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 243–51 (2013) (noting the “big benefits” of Big 
Data in the areas of healthcare, mobile, smart grid information, traffic management, retail, fraudu-
lent payments, and online data); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: 
A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 64 (2012) (“The uses of big data can be 
transformative, and the possible uses of the data can be difficult to anticipate at the time of initial 
collection.”).  But see Paul Ohm, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 339, 340 (2013) (“Big Data’s touted benefits are often less significant than claimed and 
less necessary than assumed.”). 
 6.  See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. 
REV. 671, 677 (2016); James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1189 
(2009) (“Even if Facebook were perfectly ethical and completely discreet, users would still create 
false profiles, snoop on each other, and struggle over the bounds of the private.  For this reason, 
while reports dealing with privacy and other platforms often propose strong restrictions on data 
collection and transfer, the focus of reports on social-network-site privacy is appropriately else-
where.”). 
 7.  See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75 
(2016); Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705 (2012); 
M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 29 (2011) (arguing 
that drones may be the “jolt” that brings privacy law up to speed with advancing technology); Nita 
A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012); Nita A. Farahany, Searching 
Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239 (2012); Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 
MD. L. REV. 785 (2015); Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things 
They Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57, 57 (2013) (discussing the regulation of private and govern-
ment drone use and surveying “potential axes” of how states may regulate drone use); Michael L. 
Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. 
PA. L. REV. 871 (2016); Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an 
Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597 (2011); Hideyuki Matsumi, Privacy Law 
Scholars Conference Paper Workshop: Do I Have Privacy Rights Over Predictive Information? 
(May 6, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
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collected and processed.8  But whether these FIPs-based laws provide suffi-
cient protection is debatable.9  Often they simply transfer the risk of privacy 
harm to the person whose information is being collected and used.  This is 
because control simply does not scale.  People have limited resources and 
time (what I call bandwidth) and have too many requests for “consent” for 
all of them to be meaningful. 
Finally, I argue that the FIPs have ossified.  While the ability of the 
FIPs to harmonize data protection regimes has many benefits, a commit-
ment to harmony with other regimes makes significant change difficult.  
Even when entire regimes change, as with the GDPR, the fundamental 
framework is still built around the FIPs and control, with changes at the 
margins.  Ossification would be fine if this version of the FIPs were all the 
world needed.  But the myopia and bandwidth problems mean we need 
something more.  In short, the FIPs are inadequate for the modern world. 
In Part III, I propose a new path forward for privacy law.  The best 
strategy might be to keep data accountability law rooted in the FIPs while 
incorporating new frameworks and principles.  For example, competition 
policy is now more relevant than ever, as data-driven online industries are 
opaque, have incredible power over consumers, and impose high barriers to 
entry.10  Civil rights and antidiscrimination laws should be brought to bear 
on data use.  Lawmakers should focus more on the design of consumer 
technologies.  How something is built affects how it is perceived or used.  
The design of consumer technologies can be used to frustrate fair data prac-
tices like control and transparency, or it can circumvent them and render da-
ta protection laws formulistic. 
The FIPs are not focused on design.  They focus on de-contextualized 
goals, like “openness” and “data quality.”  Phrases like “security safe-
guards” and “means of openness” in the FIPs show where design might 
complement privacy policy.  Passwords and online portals are security and 
transparency solutions, respectively, that leverage design.  But because the 
FIPs do not give any specific technology mandates or design guidance, and 
because there is no mandate to examine how people actually perceive and 
interact with consumer technologies, privacy law has largely glossed over 
design.  So, while the FIPs are quite useful for problems with data and da-
tabases, we must dig deeper. 
                                                          
 8.  Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1; Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c 5 (Can.). 
 9.  See Cate, supra note 1, at 342 and accompanying text.   
 10.  See MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY 
(2016). 
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I.  THE FIPS ARE INVALUABLE 
The FIPs have come a long way from their humble origins.  In the 
1970s, proto-versions of the FIPs started percolating in some of the earliest 
data privacy laws and government reports around the world.  The FIPs were 
first labeled as such in a 1973 report issued by the Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems for the Secretary of the U.S. Department 
of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW).11  The report, entitled Records, 
Computers and the Rights of Citizens, proposed the FIPs as a set of princi-
ples for protecting the privacy of personal data in recordkeeping systems in 
response to growing privacy concerns over computerized databases main-
tained in both the public and private sector.12  The HEW report recom-
mended some basic fair information principles that had shown up in scat-
tered legislation and reports around the world, including transparency, use 
limitation, access and correction, data quality, and security.13  These princi-
ples were the foundation for the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974, which passed the 
year after the report came out.14 
While the HEW report and a few privacy laws in Europe embraced 
some notion of accountability and transparency for data practices, the FIPs 
did not really catch fire until they were officially adopted in 1980 by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) in its 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Person-
al Data and in 1981 by the Council of Europe in the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data.15 
The OECD’s version of the FIPs implore data collecting entities to: 
   Limit the amount of personal data they collect, and col-
lect personal data with the knowledge or consent of the 
data subject (the “Collection Limitation Principle”); 
                                                          
 11.  Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History 2 (Dec. 22, 2016) (un-
published manuscript), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 3; see also Katrine 
Evans, Where in the World Is My Information? Giving People Access to Their Data, 12 IEEE 
SECURITY & PRIVACY 78, 78–79 (2014); Robert Gellman, Willis Ware’s Lasting Contribution to 
Privacy: Fair Information Practices, 12 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 51, 51–52 (2014); Deirdre 
K. Mulligan, The Enduring Importance of Transparency, 12 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 61, 62 
(2014).  
 14.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012); see also Cate, supra note 1, at 346–47.  
 15.  OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Da-
ta, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1980) [hereinafter 
OECD Guidelines], http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofpriv 
acyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm; Eur. Consult. Ass., Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ETS No. 108 (1981). 
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   Ensure that the data collected is relevant to the purpos-
es for which it will be used and is “accurate, complete, 
and up-to-date” (the “Data Quality Principle”); 
   Specify the purposes for which data is collected (the 
“Purpose Specification Principle”); 
   Obtain consent to use and disclose personal data for 
purposes other than those specified at the time of col-
lection (the “Use Limitation Principle”); 
   Take “reasonable security safeguards” to protect data 
(the “Security Safeguards Principle”); 
   Be transparent about their data collection practices and 
policies (the “Openness Principle”); 
   Allow individuals to access the data collected from 
them, to challenge the data, and to have inaccurate data 
erased, rectified, completed, or amended (the “Individ-
ual Participation Principle”); and 
   Be accountable for complying with the principles (the 
“Accountability Principle”).16 
Although neither the Council of Europe Convention or the OECD 
Guidelines used the term “fair information practices,” both of them relied 
upon the FIPs to create their guidelines.  The OECD Privacy Guidelines are 
now the most commonly cited version of the FIPs.17  The OECD claimed 
that the FIPs were created to “represent a consensus on basic principles 
which can be built into existing national legislation” and to “serve as a basis 
for legislation in those countries which do not yet have it.”18  There is no 
question that the guidelines were successful.  After the OECD guidelines, it 
was off to the races for the FIPs.  There are now more than 100 countries 
with data privacy laws and most of them are built upon most or all of the 
minimum fair information practices specified by the OECD.19  Before I dis-
cuss the FIPs’ shortcomings, in this Part I’ll focus on their significant bene-
fits, including giving the world a common language of privacy, being mal-
                                                          
 16.  OECD Guidelines, supra note 15.  
 17.  Gellman, supra note 11, at 8. 
 18.  OECD Guidelines, supra note 15. 
 19.  See GREENLEAF, supra note 2, at 52–58.  Greenleaf also notes that in addition to the 
“minimum” or first generation FIPs issued by the OECD, a second generation of FIPs has arisen 
out of Europe, which incorporates that first generation of FIPs and adds substantive protections 
like data export restrictions, rights of deletion, sensitive data protection, automated processing 
controls, and direct marketing opt-outs.  Id. at 55–56; see also Council Directive 95/46, art. 189, 
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); Data Transfers Outside the EU, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/index_en.htm (last visited May 
17, 2017). 
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leable and severable, and establishing a reference point for analyzing new 
technologies and data practices. 
A.  A Common Language of Privacy 
One of the most amazing things about a concept as diverse and squishy 
as privacy is that there is some consensus on the basic rules involving per-
sonal data.  Privacy is an inherently contextual, culturally dependent con-
cept.  Lawmakers often create problems when they attempt to impose one 
country or culture’s privacy sensibilities across cultures and individuals.  
Intel’s Paula Bruening observed that even in light of this cultural sensitivi-
ty, the “internationally recognized, fundamental principles of fair infor-
mation practices continue to provide a common language about data protec-
tion and privacy that has served nations, regions, companies and individuals 
around the world, without demanding a departure from local privacy val-
ues.”20  Bruening also noted that when there is a perceived privacy failure, 
the FIPs can be used to measure compliance and as a means of enforce-
ment.21 
Indeed, the FIPs are the closest thing the world has to a universal pri-
vacy touchstone.  Nearly every privacy regime in the world in some way 
has been shaped by the FIPs, which is surprising given the other possibili-
ties.  Recall the many different possible conceptions of privacy: control, se-
crecy, intimacy, dignity, autonomy, trust, the right to be let alone, limited 
access to the self, personhood, and more.22  Data protection laws could re-
volve around any of them.  Imagine more limited data protection regimes 
that only protect true secrets or more expansive ones that protect predictions 
and opinions in addition to “personally identifiable information.”23  Perhaps 
regimes could consider some privacy rights inalienable or mandate that data 
subjects protect themselves.24  Or they might not bestow such responsibility 
and respect on the concept of “consent” and “control.”  But for better or 
worse, the dominant conceptualization of privacy in data protection regimes 
around the world is control over personal information. 
                                                          
 20.  Bruening, supra note 1; see also Paula Bruening, Fair Information Practice Principles: A 
Common Language for Privacy in a Diverse Data Environment, POLICY@INTEL (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://blogs.intel.com/policy/2016/01/28/blah-2/. 
 21.  Bruening, supra note 1. 
 22.  Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1092, 1094 (2002).  
 23.  Tene, supra note 1, at 1219 n.1; see also id. at 1219 (“[T]he second generation [of the 
FIPs] fails to update the definition of personal data, the fundamental building block of the 
[OECD] framework.” (footnote omitted)). 
 24.  For more thoughts on inalienable privacy rights, see ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR 
PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2011), Anita L. Allen, Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a Big 
Data Economy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 71 (2016), Anita L. Allen, An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s 
Own Information Privacy?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 845 (2013).  
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While it might be tempting to chalk the lack of diversity in privacy law 
up to a paucity of imagination, the reason control won out is likely simple 
economics.  The “control” conceptualization of privacy is built for globali-
zation of the data trade.  Users are given control when they are given notice 
of a company’s information practices and they give permission to data pro-
cessors to collect and use their information.  Once that permission is grant-
ed, data can be collected, processed, leveraged, and shared accordingly.  In 
theory, data subjects are happy.  Data processors are happy.  We all win and 
the data spigot keeps pouring.  Though, as we will see, it has not really 
worked out that way. 
The mass adoption of FIPs-based regimes facilitated the European Un-
ion’s omnibus data protection legislation, which was built upon the FIPs 
and prohibited data transfers to countries that lacked adequate data protec-
tion.25  Countries seeking to collect and process data from E.U. citizens had 
great incentive to mold their own laws after the E.U.’s Data Directive (now 
GDPR), further entrenching FIPs-based regimes around the world. 
The dominance of the FIPs now means that the European Union, Can-
ada, Australia, and many Asian countries all speak substantially similar 
languages when it comes to data protection.26  Even in “FIPs-lite” countries, 
the FIPs provide a starting point for finding common ground.  For example, 
the FIPs contour U.S. privacy statutes like the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act27 (“HIPAA”) and the U.S. Federal Trade Commis-
sion’s (“FTC”) regulation of privacy, particularly through the FTC’s au-
thority to police unfair and deceptive trade practices.28 
Having a common language of privacy across countries opens the door 
for remarkable diplomatic solutions for protecting privacy in the global dig-
ital economy.  Such common ground allowed the United States and Europe 
to negotiate first the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor and then the E.U.-U.S. Privacy 
Shield to facilitate the transfer of personal data outside of the European Un-
ion.29  A common language of privacy has also been critical in the creation 
of Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (“APEC”) cross-border privacy 
                                                          
 25.  See Data Transfers Outside the EU, supra note 19.  
 26.  See generally GREENLEAF, supra note 2; Gellman, supra note 11.  A related version of 
the FIPs was incorporated into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) Privacy 
Framework.  See GREENLEAF, supra note 2, at 562–63.  
 27.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 28.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-
report/privacy2000.pdf. 
 29.  See Welcome to the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV, http://2016.export.gov/safehar 
bor/eu/eg_main_018365.asp (last updated Jan. 12, 2017); EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome (last visited May 17, 2017).  
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rules, which are designed to ensure that all participants exchanging data 
across borders are compliant with the organization’s FIPs-based privacy 
framework, among other things.30  In federated governments such as the 
United States, a common language of privacy helped states harmonize their 
laws around a common goal and minimize conflicts for industry.31  In short, 
a common language of privacy provides interoperability, relative harmony, 
and incremental change.  It helps avoid lurches that deviate too far from es-
tablished understandings of privacy.  Without the FIPs, countries and states 
would risk talking past each other every time they needed to cooperate on 
privacy issues. 
B.  Malleable and Severable 
Another advantage of the FIPs is that they are malleable enough to 
serve as the building blocks for new regulatory proposals.  In this way, pro-
gress is achieved incrementally rather than requiring an entire upheaval of 
privacy standards.  One benefit to such general standards is that they can be 
clarified in response to specific problems.  For example, Daniel Solove and 
Chris Hoofnagle have proposed a model data protection regime that adds 
more substance to the FIPs.  The authors suggested that the United States is 
unlikely to shift from its sectoral approach to an omnibus one like Europe’s, 
but even the sectoral approach can be improved by applying the FIPs.32  
David Hoffman, Associate General Counsel and Global Privacy Officer at 
Intel, has argued that “[t]he OECD FIPPs are foundational, and do not need 
to be changed.  They do, however, need to be implemented in new ways to 
properly adjust to an environment of the internet of things, cloud compu-
ting, and advanced data analytics.”33  The relative ambiguity of the FIPs, 
though, also creates room for trouble.  Fred Cate has been critical of the 
FIPs and has argued that lawmakers should “reclaim the original broader 
concept of FIPPs by adhering to Consumer Privacy Protection Principles 
(CPPPs) that include substantive restrictions on data processing designed to 
prevent specific harms.”34 
                                                          
 30.  Cross Border Privacy Rules System, ASIA-PAC. ECON COOPERATION 
http://www.cbprs.org/ (last visited May 17, 2017). 
 31.  See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 749 (2016) (“In the 1990s, while the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
was emphasizing self-regulation, state attorneys general were arguing that consumer protection 
laws required the adoption of Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs).”). 
 32.  Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 357, 357. 
 33.  David Hoffman, The Essential Link Between Privacy and Security: Optimizing for Both, 
LAWFARE (May 3, 2016, 9:48 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/essential-link-between-
privacy-and-security-optimizing-both. 
 34.  Cate, supra note 1, at 343.  
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The FIPs are also severable, meaning that countries can adopt as many 
or as few of them as they wish.  They are “mix and match” principles in 
practice, even if the drafters thought that all of them must be followed to be 
fully fair.  In his history of the FIPs, Robert Gellman wrote, “[w]hile there 
is broad international agreement on the substance of FIPs, different state-
ments of FIPs sometimes look different.  Further, statutory implementations 
of FIPs may vary in different countries, contexts, and sectors.”35  Gellman 
documented the many different ways the FIPs have been implemented, 
which vary according to the types of records and who the record keepers 
are.  In the United States, various laws have incorporated only some of the 
FIPs for specific classes of record-keepers or categories of records.  Indus-
try compliance with the FIPs is still “voluntary and sporadic.”36  Gellman 
argued that “[n]otice and choice is sometimes presented as an implementa-
tion of FIPs, but it clearly falls well short of FIPs standards.”37  Incomplete 
versions of the FIPs can also be found in rules and reports issued by the 
FTC, Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”), as well as multiple reports out of the White 
House.38  The United States is probably the most prominent country to only 
partially work the FIPs into its privacy regime.  Nearly every other country 
that has addressed privacy has given a full-throated adoption of the FIPs as 
the bedrock substantive data protections.39 
Of course, this severability has drawbacks.  Fred Cate argued “one 
problem of basing a data protection regime on FIPPS is determining which 
set of FIPPS to apply.  The OECD Guidelines provide eight, the E.U. data 
protection directive eleven, and the FTC principles only five (or four).”40  
Cate argued that the differences are often quite substantive: “For example, 
only the OECD Guidelines and APEC Framework provide an explicit col-
lection limitation principle . . . .”41 
                                                          
 35.  Gellman, supra note 11, at 19. 
 36.  Id. at 19–20. 
 37.  Id. at 20. 
 38.  See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED 
IDENTITIES IN CYBERSPACE: ENHANCING ONLINE CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, SECURITY, AND 
PRIVACY 45 (2011), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/08/ nsticstrate-
gy.pdf; EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL 
DIGITAL ECONOMY 49–52 (2012) [hereinafter CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY], 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf; NAT’L SCI. & TECH. 
COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
GRID: ENABLING OUR SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 46 (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives. 
gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/nstc-smart-grid-june2011.pdf; Gellman, supra note 11, at 
19–34 (discussing the inclusion of the FIPS by the FTC, HHS, and DHS).   
 39.  GREENLEAF, supra note 2, at 57–58. 
 40.  Cate, supra note 1, at 353. 
 41.  Id. 
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C.  A Better Litmus Test for Responsible Data Processors 
One of the most frustrating things about the concept of privacy is its 
squishiness.  The concept is so vague that it is often difficult to determine 
when we have suffered a privacy harm.  We use words like “creepy” and 
“disturbing” when confronted with privacy-invasive technologies that bug 
us in a way that we just can’t put our finger on.42  At our worst, we cannot 
create a reasonably objective anchor for new privacy threats, and we fall 
back on a Justice Stewart-like mentality in which we “know it when [we] 
see it.”43 
This clumsiness over identifying privacy harms limits what will work 
on a global scale.  Thankfully, the FIPs provide more granularity and nu-
ance to create a better litmus test for regulators, industry, and data subjects 
to determine when a data processor’s actions have gone afoul.  For exam-
ple, when app developers collect geolocation data from users’ mobile 
phones without telling them, instead of relying on creepiness or searching 
for a harm that isn’t there, regulators can point to the fact that notice was 
not given to the data subject and that there was a lack of consent.  While the 
FIPs are still generalized standards with proportionality requirements that 
lack clear lines, they focus enough on particular problems to provide a more 
objective measure of privacy than mere intuition while remaining in har-
mony with broadly adopted values like autonomy and fairness. 
Of course, like many debates typified by the tension between general 
standards and specific rules, there can be costs to granularity in the law, as 
I’ll cover below.  Too much specificity makes laws rigid and insensitive to 
context, meaning they can be a poor fit in many situations.  Specificity can 
also facilitate a “checkbox” compliance mentality that elevates a shallow 
compliance with specific rules over substantive fulfillment of the law’s 
purpose.44 
                                                          
 42.  See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shift-
ing Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 61 (2013); Evan Selinger, Why Do We Love to Call 
New Technologies “Creepy”?, SLATE (Aug. 22, 2012, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
technology/future_tense/2012/08/facial_recognition_software_targeted_advertising_we_love_to_ 
call_new_technologies_creepy_.html. 
 43.  Movie Day at the Supreme Court or “I Know It When I See It”: A History of the Defini-
tion of Obscenity, FINDLAW, http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/movie-day-at-the-
supreme-court-or-i-know-it-when-i-see-it-a.html (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 44.  See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 42, at 83.  Tene and Polonetsky explain: 
Privacy regulation—comprised primarily of the fair information privacy principles 
(FIPPs)—is a means to an end.  When viewed as a stand-alone edifice, privacy regula-
tion becomes almost meaningless, a bureaucratic box-ticking exercise involving notices 
that few users read and “consent” without information, volition, or choice.  In order to 
avoid creep, companies must engage their consumers in a meaningful conversation to 
reduce suspicion and align interests and expectations.  They need to frame relationships 
by setting the tone for new products or novel uses of information. 
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In sum, we’re basically stuck with some version of the FIPs, but for 
many good reasons.  They provide a privacy touchstone for regulators, in-
dustry, and the public.  Such a polestar is needed because people regularly 
disagree about privacy policy.  For example, is mere exposure from a data 
breach a harm, or is it only a harm when information is misused?  Can we 
have privacy in public?  Should there be a right to be forgotten?  There’s 
good room for debate on these issues.  But when common ground must be 
found, we regularly count on the FIPs.  Need a privacy regulatory regime 
acceptable to industry?  Base it off the FIPs because it facilitates data pro-
cessing.  Need an industry practice that will keep regulators and the public 
happy?  Just follow some version of the FIPs, which has the distinct ad-
vantage of being more or less the “industry standard.”  In theory, everyone 
wins something.  The only problem is that these days the FIPs are not 
enough. 
II.  THE FIPS ARE INDEQUATE 
Griping about the FIPs is not new.  Since their inception, critics have 
taken issue with both the substance of the FIPs as well as how they have 
been implemented.  When the FIPs first rose to prominence in 1980, James 
Rule and his colleagues criticized the FIPs for their failure to meaningfully 
limit surveillance systems.  They categorized the FIPs as “efficiency” prin-
ciples that endeavored to smooth the harsh edges of information systems to 
operate better for both data controllers and data subjects, instead of substan-
tively limiting data collection against the interests of data controllers.45 
Rule and his colleagues also criticized the efficiency mission of the 
FIPs because it opportunistically allowed those who were engaging in mass, 
corrosive data collection to get the benefit of the perception of “privacy pro-
tection” though formalistic compliance.  They wrote that under the FIPs’ 
criteria, “organisations can claim to protect the privacy of those with whom 
they deal, even as they demand more and more data from them, and accu-
mulate ever more power over their lives.”46  Graham Greenleaf noted that 
this fundamental tension in the FIPs remains today, with questions still 
asked too infrequently, “to what extent do and should data privacy princi-
ples and laws go beyond attempting to ensure the ‘efficiency’ of personal 
                                                          
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 45.  GREENLEAF, supra note 2, at 60–61 (citing JAMES RULE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF 
PRIVACY 93 (1980)). 
 46.  Id. (quoting RULE ET AL., supra note 45, at 93); see also Claudia Diaz et al., Hero or Vil-
lain: The Data Controller in Privacy Law and Technologies, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 923, 924–25 (2013) 
(“The notion of the data controller as a trusted party is ill at ease with the anti-surveillance gist of 
constitutional privacy and PETs.”). 
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information systems, and provide means to limit and control the expansion 
of surveillance systems?”47 
The efficiency goal of the FIPs has also led to problems in the way that 
these regimes have been implemented.  Above all, FIPs regimes are de-
signed to effectuate “consent” to data practices and “control” over infor-
mation.  Consent and control quickly turn FIPs-based privacy rules into 
formalistic exercises designed to extract consent and use the gift of control 
to saddle the data subject with the risk of loss for data misuse.  Fred Cate 
criticized FIPs-based regimes that are centered around control, writing, “the 
control-based system of data protection, with its reliance on narrow, proce-
dural FIPPS, is not working.  The available evidence suggests that privacy 
is not better protected.  The flurry of notices may give individuals some il-
lusion of enhanced privacy, but the reality is far different.”48  Cate argued, 
The result is the worst of all worlds: privacy protection is not en-
hanced, individuals and businesses pay the cost of bureaucratic 
laws, and we have become so enamored with notice and choice 
that we have failed to develop better alternatives.  The situation 
only grows worse as more states and nations develop inconsistent 
data protection laws with which they attempt to regulate increas-
ingly global information flows.49 
Lisa Austin has also criticized the consent and control approach to pri-
vacy, writing, “consent-based privacy models are inadequate in the face of 
contemporary information practices and the emerging corporate–state nexus 
that has created such a striking surveillance infrastructure on the internet.”50  
Mark MacCarthy has criticized consent regimes because they can make any 
information practice legitimate, even truly corrosive ones.51  And, of course, 
substantive and practical problems with the FIPs are compounded by the 
fact that FIPs-based regimes are entrenched and difficult to change. 
                                                          
 47.  GREENLEAF, supra note 2, at 61.  
 48.  Cate, supra note 1, at 342. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Austin, supra note 1, at 189.  Austin notes: 
[There is a] structural problem relating to what consent regulates.  This model of priva-
cy law regulates personal information, which includes information about an “identifia-
ble” person.  The problem is that this is an all-or-nothing model where FIPs apply in re-
lation to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information but not other 
forms . . . . 
Id. at 137–38 (footnote omitted) (citing Lisa M. Austin, Reviewing PIPEPA: Control, Privacy, 
and the Limit of Fair Information Practices, 44 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 21 (2006); Paul Ohm, Bro-
ken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1701 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011)).  
 51.  See generally MacCarthy, supra note 1.  
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The FIPs are not completely entrenched, however.  They have been 
improved slightly.  The OECD, European Union, and United States made a 
push in the 1990s to modify the FIPs and usher in what has been referred to 
as a “second generation” of FIPs.52  The most important addition in terms of 
substantive privacy protection was the “purpose limitation” practice, which 
limited what data controllers can do with the information it collects.  How-
ever, the second generation of FIPs is still strongly rooted in its original 
framework.  Omer Tene has criticized this second generation of FIPs as in-
adequate because, among other things, it fails to update the definition of 
personal data, it still clings to and even broadens the central role of consent, 
and it remains “rooted on a linear approach to processing whereby an active 
‘data controller’ collects information from a passive individual, and then 
stores, uses, or transfers it until its ultimate deletion.”53 
I agree with both the dominant intrinsic and instantiated critiques of 
the FIPs.  The FIPs seem to have facilitated more surveillance and a shift in 
power to data collectors that a more robust resistance to the data complex 
might have prevented.  And as you’ll see below, I also lament the obsession 
of some FIPs regimes with formalistic compliance through consent instead 
of a more meaningful form of accountability. 
However, in this Essay, I will focus on a few critiques of the FIPs that 
have not been given enough attention.  The FIPs are inadequate because: (1) 
they have important blind spots regarding the collection, use, and disclosure 
of personal information that cannot be resolved through more specificity or 
better implementation; and (2) they fail to address the user bandwidth prob-
lem that would persist even if users were given every bit of control imagi-
nable over their data. 
The FIPs were first developed before most people even imagined own-
ing a personal computer.  They were designed to handle the issues that re-
sulted from the collection and conversion of information into storable, 
searchable databases.  The reality of everyone having a supercomputer, sur-
veillance device, and beacon in their pockets with an accumulated digital 
universe of around 44 trillion gigabytes (!) was still a long way off.54  So-
cial media, biometrics, drones, and robots that interacted regularly with 
humans hadn’t even been invented yet.55  Yet here we are, with a new set of 
                                                          
 52.  See GREENLEAF, supra note 2, at 55–57; Tene, supra note 1, at 1228–29. 
 53.  Tene, supra note 1, at 1219. 
 54.  See Bernard Marr, Big Data: 20 Mind-Boggling Facts Everyone Must Read, FORBES 
(Sept. 30, 2015, 2:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/09/30/big-data-20-
mind-boggling-facts-everyone-must-read/#5b3c876f6c1d.  
 55.  See M. Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 187, 196 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012); Ryan Calo, Robotics and the 
Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (2015); Hartzog, supra note 7; Margot E. Kaminski, 
Robots in the Home: What Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 661 (2015); see also M. 
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problems that the FIPs only partially address.  We will need to get creative 
to solve them. 
A.  The FIPs Have Blind Spots 
1. Our Vulnerabilities to Each Other 
While the FIPs can be useful to articulate lofty design goals like trans-
parency and data minimization, they are poor guides for setting design 
boundaries for information technologies for two main reasons: (1) they are 
primarily concerned with how data is controlled and processed and (2) they 
too often serve to elevate formalistic notions of “choice” and “control” over 
meaningful privacy protections. 
The FIPs articulate desirable endpoints: openness, security, data quali-
ty, accountability, etc.  However, they are mainly concerned with data col-
lection, processing, and storage, not with the design that facilitates these ac-
tions.  The FIPs do not directly address the effect of design signals and 
transaction costs on trust, obscurity, and autonomy.  The FIPs also fail to 
provide meaningful concrete guidance to lawmakers or companies regard-
ing specific design choices like how to effectively disclaim or warn people 
regarding an important privacy-related practice or function.56  Scholars like 
James Grimmelmann, Deirdre Mulligan, and Jennifer King have critiqued 
the FIPs as ineffective to guide the design of information technologies be-
cause they ignore the privacy problems inherent in the social exchange of 
information like social media.57 
                                                          
Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571 (2011); M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A 
New Dimension to Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809 (2010). 
 56.  Florian Schaub, Rebecca Balebako, Adam L. Durity, and Lorrie Faith Cranor wrote: 
  Existing frameworks and processes for building privacy-friendly systems, such as 
Privacy by Design or privacy impact assessments, focus on the analysis of a system’s 
data practices and less so on the design of notices.  Even the OECD report on “making 
privacy notices simple” basically states that one should design a simplified notice, con-
duct usability tests, and deploy it—the crucial point of how to design a simplified notice 
is not addressed.  
Florian Schaub et al., A Design Space for Effective Privacy Notices, 11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1–2 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (first citing G. 
DANEZIS ET AL., EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFO. SEC., PRIVACY AND DATA 
PROTECTION BY DESIGN–FROM POLICY TO ENGINEERING (2014); then citing PRIVACY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK CONSORTIUM, A PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR 
DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS (David Wright et al. eds., 2011); and then citing 
OECD, MAKING PRIVACY NOTICES SIMPLE: AN OECD REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 120 
(2006), https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/International-APPA-APEC/Making-Privacy-
Notices-Simple-An-OECD-Report-and-Recommendations.pdf).  See OECD, supra, at 2–7. 
 57.  See James Grimmelmann, Privacy as Product Safety, 19 WIDENER L.J. 793, 820 (2010); 
Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 989, 993 (2012).  
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The FIPs are concerned with how powerful entities deal with aggre-
gated personal information.  But as James Grimmelmann noted, even if so-
cial media companies were completely compliant with the FIPs, “users 
would still create false profiles, snoop on each other, and struggle over the 
bounds of the private.  For this reason, while reports dealing with privacy 
and other platforms often propose strong restrictions on data collection and 
transfer, the focus of reports on social-network-site privacy is appropriately 
elsewhere.”58  Lisa Austin has also noted these blind spots, arguing that 
“[w]e need to broaden our focus beyond consent and understand the im-
portance of audience segregation, audience obligations, and practices of 
tact, and the role of social norms and roles.”59 
The basic framework of fair information practices was developed to 
address the issue of the collection, use and disclosure of personal infor-
mation by large organizations, in the context of concerns regarding comput-
er networks.  The key relationship informing this privacy model is the indi-
vidual-organization relationship.  However, contemporary Internet 
companies increasingly operate as information intermediaries, mediating 
other types of relationships in complex ways.  This raises a number of ques-
tions regarding how a regime modeled on one type of relationship can regu-
late practices that in fact cover multiple, often intersecting, relationships.60 
Consider social media.  Unlike, say, your banking app, social media 
have two distinct audiences for your information: platforms and people.  
These two audiences present overlapping but distinguishable privacy issues.  
Platforms, meaning the companies that provide the social media software, 
are squarely the concern of the FIPs because they have robust concentra-
tions of electronic information aggregated into colossal databases.61  These 
platforms are risky because of how much data they can obtain from you and 
the fact that they control the terms of your mediated experience.  After all, it 
is the company that designs the software. 
Social relationships are risky to manage online because it is difficult to 
assess social risk at scale and the boundaries of social relationships have 
blurry edges.62  In other words, while the harm from platforms is usually 
enabled by the aggregation of lots of data by one entity, the harm from peo-
ple is often that one piece of information is exposed to the wrong audience.  
                                                          
 58.  Grimmelmann, supra note 6, at 1189. 
 59.  Austin, supra note 1, at 183. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Bruce Schneier, A Revised Taxonomy of Social Networking Data, SCHNEIER ON 
SECURITY (Aug. 10, 2010, 6:51 AM), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/08/ 
a_taxonomy_of _s_1.html; see also Bruce Schneier, A Taxonomy of Social Networking Data, 8 
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 88, 88 (2010). 
 62.  See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1315 (2009); Grimmelmann, supra note 6.  
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And these two distinct information recipients, platforms and people, present 
different challenges.  Platforms are dangerous because of the power imbal-
ance between platforms and users.  People are dangerous because social in-
teraction is messy and contextual with a vengeance.63  And the FIPs have 
nothing to say about other people. 
2.  Our Susceptibility to Manipulation 
One of our more endearing traits as humans is also one of our biggest 
weaknesses—we want to believe.  The literature is full of examples of how 
people behave in predictably irrational ways.  I have written elsewhere that 
“[h]umans rely too much on available anecdotes and judgments reached by 
computers.  We attribute human emotions and agency to machines.  We 
care too much what others think about us and we increasingly entrench our-
selves in opinions formed based on trivial, anecdotal, and arbitrary evi-
dence.”64  And these biases are regularly exploited by those with something 
to gain from it. 
Here’s the problem.  Mediated experiences like interactions with user 
interfaces or even robots can be designed to exploit those vulnerabilities.  
Ryan Calo has observed that personal information is often leverage to mass 
produce bias, systemically ratchet-up disclosures, and target based on peo-
ple’s means.65  He calls this a kind of “digital market manipulation.”  Kate 
Darling has argued that our tendency to emotionally invest in robots is 
worth paying attention to because of just how deep these connections run.66  
When a robot moves, talks, or looks alive, we tend to over-ascribe them 
with agency, intelligence, emotion, and feeling.  Calo agrees, noting, 
“[t]here is an extensive literature to support the claim that people are ‘hard-
wired’ to react to anthropomorphic technology such as robots as though a 
person were actually present.  The tendency is so strong that soldiers have 
reportedly risked their own lives to ‘save’ a military robot in the field.”67 
                                                          
 63.  For more information including principles regulating social data, see Woodrow Hartzog, 
Social Data, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 995 (2013).  
 64.  Hartzog, supra note 7, at 802 (first citing DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND 
SLOW (2013); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS (2d ed. 2009); DANIEL THAYER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVISING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2d ed. 2009); then citing Danielle Keats Citron, 
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2007); and then citing Kate Darling, Ex-
tending Legal Rights to Social Robots (April 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://robots.law.miami.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Darling_Extending-Legal-Rights-to-
Social-Robots-v2.pdf). 
 65.  Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1006–07 (2014).  
 66.  Darling, supra note 64. 
 67.  RYAN CALO, BROOKINGS, THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL ROBOTICS COMMISSION (2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/09/case-for-federal-robotics-commission (citing 
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In previous research, I have asked: “How might [human-like] robots 
affect the elderly, for whom robots have great potential as companions?  Or 
what about children, who have difficulty parsing complex emotional at-
tachments and understanding how robots work?”68  Research has shown 
that children think of robots as friends and tell them secrets.69  Kids’ toys 
are ripe to be designed to simulate and stimulate emotional bonds and ma-
nipulate children to share information. 
The FIPs have little to say about our susceptibility to manipulation.  
User interfaces can be designed to extract our “consent” or to encourage us 
to disclose in ways that we do not even notice.  Visual rhetoric, anthropo-
morphism, and other psychological tools can be deployed in the shadow of 
the FIPs, which demand only transparency as to data collection and use 
practices.  Data that is collected with our consent can be leveraged against 
us.  The FIPs do not articulate any meaningful limits on companies who 
would use our own cognitive limitations against us or give any clear sense 
of when companies have crossed an ethical line in using our own data in 
trying to persuade us to share more, click an ad, or make a purchase online.  
Given the increasing efficacy of machine learning and big data, this threat 
will only continue to grow. 
3.  Our Helplessness to Automated Decisionmaking 
Big Data and algorithms promise to revolutionize the decisionmaking 
process of organizations.  Decisions that used to be made by humans based 
upon a small amount of information are now going to be made by automat-
ed software based upon exabytes of data.70  Danielle Citron noted that 
where humans used to rely upon computers merely to help them make deci-
sions, automated systems have increasingly become the primary deci-
sionmakers.71  She explained that these systems take humans out of the loop 
when terminating individuals’ Medicaid, food stamp, other welfare benefits, 
                                                          
P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 337–43 (2009)). 
 68.  Hartzog, supra note 7, at 806 (citing A Robotic Companion for the Elderly?, GE IDEA 
LAB (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.ideaslaboratory.com/post/94619189589/a-robotic-companion-
for-the-elderly).  But see Amanda Sharkey & Noel Sharkey, Granny and the Robots: Ethical Is-
sues in Robot Care for the Elderly, 14 ETHICS AND INFO. TECH. 27 (2012).  
 69.  Jacqueline Kory Westlund & Cynthia Breazeal, Deception, Secrets, Children, and Ro-
bots: What’s Acceptable?, 10 ACM/IEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN-ROBOT 
INTERACTION 1–2 (2015), http://www.openroboethics.org/hri15/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Mf-
Westlund.pdf. 
 70.  An exabyte is 1 billion gigabytes.  Daniel Price, Surprising Facts and Stats About the Big 
Data Industry, CLOUDTWEAKS (Mar. 17, 2015), http://cloudtweaks.com/2015/03/surprising-facts-
and-stats-about-the-big-data-industry/.  
 71.  Citron, supra note 64, at 1252.  
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and the process of targeting people for exclusion from air travel.72  Moreo-
ver, she observed that “[c]omputer programs identify parents believed to 
owe child support and instruct state agencies to file collection proceedings 
against those individuals.  Voters are purged from the rolls without notice, 
and small businesses are deemed ineligible for federal contracts.”73  This 
raises some serious issues, including threats to due process,74 disparate im-
pact on minority and other vulnerable communities,75 invasions of privacy 
and stigmatization due to the powerful predictive power of data analytics,76 
and more. 
What’s worse, opting out of automated decisionmaking soon won’t 
even be an option.  If governments embrace scoring systems similar to cred-
it scores—but for everything—we risk turning into what Frank Pasquale 
and Danielle Citron call a “scored society.”77  Even without government as-
sistance, the general zeal in industry to score everything so that it may be 
ranked, filed, and sorted will increasingly subjugate the public to the sorting 
whims of companies deploying algorithms.78  We’re seeing the seeds of this 
right now.  China is moving to “give every citizen a score based on behav-
ior such as spending habits, turnstile violations and filial piety, which can 
blacklist citizens from loans, jobs, [and] air travel.”79  Autonomous systems 
can be a force for good, but their value is not inherent.  Whether they are 
beneficial is entirely dependent upon who is using them and how they are 
deployed. 
Kate Crawford and Ryan Calo have argued, “[a]utonomous systems 
are already deployed in our most crucial social institutions, from hospitals 
to courtrooms.  Yet there are no agreed methods to assess the sustained ef-
                                                          
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. (footnotes omitted) (first citing Susannah Zak Figura, Where’s Dad?, GOV’T. EXEC., 
Dec. 1, 1998, at 12; then citing Letter from Juliet T. Hodgkins, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Election Assis-
tance Comm’n, to Sarah Ball Johnson, Executive Dir., Ky. State Bd. of Elections (May 11, 2006) 
(on file with Danielle Keats Citron); then citing Denise Kersten, Bytes vs. Brains, GOV’T EXEC., 
Sept. 1, 2005, at 30).  
 74.  See id. at 1249.   
 75.  See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 6. 
 76.  Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
81, 83 (2013). 
 77.  Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2014); see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX 
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 191 (2015); Tal 
Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1375 
(2014); Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1740, 1745 (2015). 
 78.  See PASQUALE, supra note 77, at 69. 
 79.  Josh Chin & Gillian Wong, China’s New Tool for Social Control: A Credit Rating for 
Everything, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2016, 11:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-new-
tool-for-social-control-a-credit-rating-for-everything-1480351590.  
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fects of such applications on human populations.”80  The authors argue that 
there is a need to assess the impact of automated technologies in their so-
cial, cultural and political settings. 
For example, Crawford and Calo wrote that research is needed to de-
termine “how the app AiCure—which tracks patients’ adherence to taking 
prescribed medication and transmits records to physicians—is changing the 
doctor–patient relationship.”81  Or perhaps researchers would “explore 
whether the use of historical data to predict where crimes will happen is 
driving overpolicing of marginalized communities.”82  Or maybe research-
ers might ask, “why high-rolling investors are given the right to understand 
the financial decisions made on their behalf by humans and algorithms, 
whereas low-income loan seekers are often left to wonder why their re-
quests have been rejected.”83 
The FIPs alone will not provide a framework for answering or re-
sponding to these questions.  They might be able to affect the periphery of 
autonomous decisionmaking problems by limiting the corpus of data used 
in decisionmaking systems.  But the FIPs do not address the major, struc-
tural problems inherent in automated systems, including the fact that it is 
very difficult to erase bias from autonomous systems because of the biased 
humans creating them, the fact that the cost of these systems are not borne 
equally by all members of society, and the fact that people tend to irration-
ally trust conclusions reached by computers more than conclusions reached 
by humans, solely because of their automated nature—a phenomenon 
known as “automation bias.”84  While the FIPs protect the integrity and 
fairness of databases themselves, they do not fully address the risks inherent 
in automated decisionmaking systems. 
                                                          
 80.  Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, NATURE (Oct. 13, 
2016), http://www.nature.com/news/there-is-a-blind-spot-in-ai-research-1.20805.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See Citron, supra note 65, at 1271–72.  As Citron explained it:  
Studies show that human beings rely on automated decisions even when they suspect 
system malfunction.  The impulse to follow a computer’s recommendation flows from 
human “automation bias”—the “use of automation as a heuristic replacement for vigi-
lant information seeking and processing.”  Automation bias effectively turns a comput-
er program’s suggested answer into a trusted final decision. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (first citing Raja Parasuraman & Christopher A. Miller, Trust and Etiquette 
in High-Criticality Automated Systems, 47 COMM. ACM 51, 52 (2004); then quoting Linda J. 
Skitka et al., Automation Bias and Errors: Are Crews Better Than Individuals?, 10 INT’L J. 
AVIATION PSYCHOL. 85, 86 (2000); and then citing M.L. Cummings, The Social and Ethical Im-
pact of Decision Support Interface Design, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ERGONOMICS 
AND HUMAN FACTORS 1, 7 (Waldemar Karwowski ed., 2d. ed. 2006)).  
 2017] THE INADEQUATE, INVALUABLE FIPS 973 
 
B.  The FIPs Have a Bandwidth Problem 
Let me be blunt: privacy regulators and designers have made a big 
mistake by hinging virtually everything on FIPs-based regimes centered 
around the idea of control or consent.  Control has become a talisman for 
privacy protection.85  This is a problem because control is a critical finite 
resource for people.  Yet FIPs-based data protection regimes treat it like a 
bottomless well. 
In theory, the goal of the FIPs is to empower data subjects.  To em-
power in this context means to put in control—to ensure that data subjects 
(1) have knowledge of a data collector’s activities and (2) give consent for 
certain practices.  Knowing companies’ data practices and requiring them to 
seek your consent for any material thing they want to do sounds good in 
theory.  It ostensibly helps people decide for themselves how to weigh the 
costs and benefits of the collection, use, or disclosure of their information. 
Control has become the archetype for data protection regimes.  It is the 
first right articulated in the Obama Administration’s proposed “Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights.”86  Control was also a major component of the 
FTC’s report on “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid 
Change.”87  Consent is the linchpin of the entire European Union’s GDPR.  
It legitimizes most kinds of data collection, use, and disclosure.88 
In fact, control over information is often floated as the very definition 
of privacy itself.  The great privacy scholar Alan Westin defined privacy as 
“the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for them-
selves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communi-
cated to others.”89  Others, including Arthur Miller, Charles Fried, Ferdi-
nand Schoeman, and Richard Parker, conceptualize privacy in terms of 
control as well.90  Countless popular press articles and books are aimed at 
                                                          
 85.  For additional critiques of the “consent” model for effectuating the FIPs, see, for exam-
ple, Kevin D. Haggerty, What’s Wrong With Privacy Protections? Provocations from a Fifth Col-
umnist, in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY: WHAT LAW CAN AND SHOULD DO? 190, 190–91 (Aus-
tin Sarat ed. 2015), Lisa M. Austin, Is Consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? 
Canada’s Experience Under PIPEDA, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 181 (2006), Cate, supra note 1, and 
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 5.  
 86.  CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 1. 
 87.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-
privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.  
 88.  See Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 7 (“In order for processing to be 
lawful, personal data should be processed on the basis of the consent of the data subject concerned 
or some other legitimate basis . . . .”). 
 89.  ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 5 (2015) (1967).  
 90.  DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 24–25 (2008). 
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helping us “take control” of our privacy online.91  Indeed, technology com-
panies seem to be making a good faith effort to gradually increase and sim-
plify user control where appropriate.92 
Control is an industry favorite privacy tool as well.  To hear tech com-
panies tell it, the answer to modern privacy problems is just to give users 
more control.  Employees from Facebook have stated, their “philosophy 
that people own their information and control who they share it with has 
remained constant.”93  Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg said, 
“[w]hat people want isn’t complete privacy.  It isn’t that they want secrecy.  
It’s that they want control over what they share and what they don’t.”94  Mi-
crosoft CEO Satya Nadella summarized his company’s focus on user con-
trol stating, “Microsoft experiences will be unique as they will . . . keep a 
user in control of their privacy[,]” adding that the company will 
“[a]dvocat[e] laws and legal processes that keep people in control.”95  
Google has written, “Google builds simple, powerful privacy and security 
tools that keep your information safe and put you in control of it.”96  There 
is seemingly no privacy problem for governments or technology companies 
that more user control cannot fix.  Just chuck some more control at it. 
In theory, this is a laudable goal.  In practice, it hasn’t worked out so 
well.  There are two problems with elevating control.  First, control doesn’t 
scale.  The sheer number of choices that inundate users under a control re-
gime is overwhelming to the point of futility.  Second, the other FIPs be-
come subservient.  Fixation on control sidelines other important principles, 
such as limiting data collection in the first place. 
                                                          
 91.  See, e.g., JOE KISSELL, TAKE CONTROL OF YOUR ONLINE PRIVACY (2015); Privacy Sur-
vival Guide: Take Control of Your Personal Information, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
1997 (Bulletin); 5 Ways to Control your Privacy on Google, USA TODAY (Mar. 16, 2012, 3:30 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-03-17/google-privacy-settings/535732 
66/1; Eric Griffith, Take Control of Your Google Privacy, PC MAG. (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2486726,00.asp.   
 92.  See, e.g., Jules Polonetsky, Facebook’s Privacy Dinosaur, LINKEDIN (Mar. 26, 2014), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140326110913-258347-facebook-s-privacy-dinosaur.  
 93.  Kathy H. Chan, On Facebook, People Own and Control Their Information, FACEBOOK 
(Feb. 16, 2009, 5:09 PM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/on-facebook-people-own-
and-control-their-information/54434097130.  
 94.  Michael Zimmer, Mark Zuckerberg’s Theory of Privacy, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/mark-zuckerbergs-theory-of-privacy/2014/02/03/ 
2c1d780a-8cea-11e3-95dd-36ff657a4dae_story.html (quoting a 2010 interview by Time Magazine 
with Mark Zuckerberg).  
 95.  Data Privacy Day 2015—Putting People in Control, MICROSOFT CORP. BLOGS (Jan. 28, 
2015), http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2015/01/28/data-privacy-day-2015-putting-people 
-control/ (quoting an e-mail from Satya Nadella, CEO Microsoft, to Microsoft employees).  
 96.  Guemmy Kim, Keeping Your Personal Information Private and Safe—And Putting You 
in Control, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (June 1, 2015), https://googleblog.blogspot.com/ 
2015/06/privacy-security-tools-improvements.html.  
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Professor Neil Richards and I have cautioned against over-relying on 
the notion of control to protect privacy.97  We call this misguided allegiance 
to control the “Control Illusion.”  The Control Illusion dominates privacy 
policy as well as public discourse.  When the FTC first started to regulate 
privacy in the late 1990s, it adopted a basic control scheme for businesses 
dubbed “notice and choice.”  People were said to have “control” over their 
information when they were notified about a company’s information collec-
tion, use, and disclosure practices and given a choice to opt out (usually by 
not using the service).  Failure to opt-out acts as a permission slip for com-
panies, so long as they act within the boundaries of that ubiquitous, reada-
ble block of text called the privacy policy.98  Through notice and choice, 
“control” is leveraged to become a little more than a mechanism optimized 
to generate consent. 
The problem with notice, choice, and control is that it is impossible to 
scale.  No one can read all the privacy policies they come across.99  People 
have lives to get on with and if they took the time to read and make sure 
they understand all the terms of use they came across, they would do little 
else.  What’s worse is that we cannot escape the boilerplate.  Living offline 
simply isn’t an option in the modern world.100 
The “control” we get ends up being too much of a good thing.  From 
the moment people boot up a device, they are gifted with “control” over in-
formation in the form of privacy policies, terms of use, and pop-up banners 
for each and every website or app you visit or use.  The incessant onslaught 
is enough to make anyone’s eyes gloss over and click on whatever is pre-
sented to us, just so we can finally use the service.  Some regulators are 
coming around to the futility of notice and the absence of real choice about 
the pervasive collection of personal data.  The White House Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board recognized as much in its long-awaited re-
port on privacy and surveillance.101  In its report on Big Data, the White 
                                                          
 97.  Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016).  
 98.  Id. at 444–47. 
 99.  Alexis C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would Take 
76 Work Days, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2012/03/reading-the-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851/; 
see also Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 
ISJLP 543 (2008). 
 100.  JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM 
IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 41 (2014). 
 101.  PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS 
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 137 (2014). 
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House also questioned the ongoing validity of the “notice and consent” ap-
proach to data protection.102 
Even the FTC has realized the limits of notice and choice.103  The 
agency’s report on protecting consumer privacy in the digital age acknowl-
edged that “the emphasis on notice and choice alone has not sufficiently ac-
counted for other widely recognized fair information practices, such as ac-
cess, collection limitation, purpose specification, and assuring data quality 
and integrity.”104  Yet despite the acknowledgment that notice and choice 
cannot do the work we ask of it, the mantra of user control persists. 
There is hope for control as an aspect of privacy.  We simply must 
stop treating it as though it were an infinite resource.  It’s a little like the 
problem of trying to remember all of your passwords.  You may be able to 
remember a few, but it is almost impossible to remember them all.  Control 
is too precious for companies and lawmakers to over-leverage it.  Control 
can enable autonomy, but it is not the same thing as autonomy.  Any sound 
approach to privacy must ensure the right amount of control, autonomy, and 
freedom of choice for people.  The problem comes when the pursuit of con-
trol becomes the main or only way companies address privacy. 
At best, prioritizing “control” of our personal information over other 
goals, like enforcing trust obligations and minimizing data collection, is 
fool’s gold.  At worst, it’s a trap.  Psychologist Barry Schwartz argued in 
The Paradox of Choice that while autonomy and freedom of choice are crit-
ical human values, too many choices and too much control can actually 
                                                          
 102.  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING 
VALUES 54 (2014); see also FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N.,  FACT SHEET: THE FCC ADOPTS 
ORDER TO GIVE BROADBAND CONSUMERS INCREASED CHOICE OVER THEIR PERSONAL 
INFORMATION, https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-341938A1.pdf (last visited 
May 17, 2017) (demonstrating that the FCC’s proposed broadband privacy rules also inherently 
recognize the limitations of the old notice and consent model by providing rules that focus on 
meaningful consent and opt-ins as opposed to opt-outs).  
 103.  Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Annual Conference on 
Privacy & Data Security Law: Proskauer on Privacy (Oct. 19, 2010) (“[T]he Notice and Choice 
model, as it is often deployed today, places too great a burden on consumers.”); Jon Leibowitz, 
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Introductory Remarks at the FTC Privacy Roundtable (Dec. 7, 
2009) (“We do feel that the approaches we’ve tried so far—both the notice and choice regime, and 
later the harm-based approach—haven’t worked quite as well as we would like.”). 
 104.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 20 (2010).  The report also 
acknowledged the limits of privacy harm stating:  
The FTC’s harm-based approach also has limitations.  In general, it focuses on a narrow 
set of privacy-related harms—those that cause physical or economic injury or unwar-
ranted intrusion into consumers’ daily lives.  But, for some consumers, the actual range 
of privacy-related harms is much wider and includes reputational harm, as well as the 
fear of being monitored or simply having private information “out there.” 
Id.  
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overwhelm and confuse us.105  Professors Idris Adjerid, Alessandro Acquis-
ti, and George Loewenstein called upon this notion to argue that choice 
mechanisms without supplemental protections are likely to mislead con-
sumers, quelling their privacy concerns without providing meaningful pro-
tection.106  People feel falsely empowered by opportunities to restrict the 
collection and use of their personal information.   
Control regimes can also shift the burden of responsibility for protect-
ing privacy to people who are less equipped to handle it.  The modern data 
ecosystem is hopelessly complex and opaque.  Data subjects have the few-
est resources of every party in the chain of data flows and they are on the 
wrong side of substantial information and power disparities.  While control 
is an attractive goal in isolation, it comes with a practical and legal obliga-
tion.  If you do not exercise that control, you are at risk.  Companies can 
take your inaction as acquiescence. 
In the aggregate, the weight of too much control will crush us.  It will 
leave us bewildered, hopeless, and agreeable to anything.  Privacy policies 
become “anti-privacy policies” because companies know that we will never 
read them.  The default settings for privacy controls are permissive, because 
companies know that we do not usually change them.  Retail stores tracking 
your devices only let you opt out online instead of in the store because they 
know you probably will not remember or make the effort to do so later.107  
Control is a vital but scarce resource.  It is easily diluted.  Adversarial de-
sign can make the downsides to control worse.  Prioritizing control hides 
the power imbalances inherent in our modern mediated lives.  Privacy re-
gimes should seek to preserve control for when it can be the most effective, 
and leave the rest to other concepts, like privacy-friendly design. 
III.  A SHIFT TO DESIGN: THE FIPS AS A GOOD START 
If the FIPs are not enough, then what is needed?  What are the best al-
ternatives to control in light of the fact that regulators are unlikely to aban-
don the FIPs?  In a sense, modern privacy law is still all about “control,” 
but its locus has shifted from individuals’ control over their own infor-
mation to the control that others can exert over someone by virtue of the in-
formation they possess.108  In other words, modern privacy law is not about 
                                                          
 105.  BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2005).  
 106.  Idris Adjerid et al., Framing and the Malleability of Privacy Choices (unpublished manu-
script) http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2014/papers/AdjeridAcquistiLoewenstein-WEIS 
2014.pdf (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 107.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Retail Tracking Firm Settles FTC Charges it Misled 
Consumers About Opt Out Choices (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/04/retail-tracking-firm-settles-ftc-charges-it-misled-consumers.  
 108.  See, e.g., Calo, supra note 65. 
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choice.  It’s about abuse of power.109  In that light, the most obvious areas 
of law to bring into privacy law’s fold are those principally concerned with 
abuse of power, such as antitrust, unfair competition law and anti-
discrimination law. 
A.  The Future of Privacy is in the Market, the Mind, and the Machine 
Big data has made the market more important to privacy law than ever 
before.  Maurice Stucke and Allan Grunes argued that modern data practic-
es raise both privacy and antitrust concerns.110  The authors observe that 
mergers can “lessen non-price competition in terms of the array of privacy 
protections offered to consumers.  Likewise, monopolies’ data-driven ex-
clusionary practices can hamper innovative alternatives that afford consum-
ers greater privacy protection.”111  Many companies do not face pressure to 
truly compete on privacy.  The authors argue that market forces are not cur-
rently solving privacy issues and that data-driven industries are subject to 
network effects, increasing the power of Big Data to exploit data sub-
jects.112  Chris Hoofnagle has advocated for an evolved role for the FTC’s 
Bureau of Economics (BE) in identifying and encouraging a more robust 
market for privacy.113  Peter Swire has argued that the FTC should consider 
privacy impacts in assessing mergers.114  From here on out, privacy law 
must take market power more seriously. 
Privacy law must also deal with the machines.  We’re going to need a 
whole new approach to artificial intelligence (“AI”) if it is to be a sustaina-
ble technology.  To begin, the FIP of data minimization principle is at odds 
with refining AI systems and mitigating the bias inherent in the systems.  
                                                          
 109.  See Austin, supra note 1, at 159. 
 110.  STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 10; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The Federal Trade 
Commission’s Inner Privacy Struggle 1, 15, 18 (U.C. Berkeley Public Law Research, Paper No. 
2901526, 2017). 
 111.  STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 10, at 4. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See Hoofnagle, supra note 110, at 18 (“Elucidating areas where some valuation of priva-
cy exists—particularly in business to business scenarios where actors actually read policies and 
have the resources and time to protect rights—could help establish a value for privacy.”). 
 114.  Peter Swire, Protecting Consumers: Privacy Matters in Antitrust Analysis, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (Oct. 19, 2007, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/ 
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Id.; see also Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Con-
sumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335 (2013). 
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AI needs a steady stream of good, quality data to improve.  One way to ap-
proach this is to shift away from a FIPs mindset to one that focuses on other 
problems besides just data collection.  Crawford and Calo have argued in 
favor of a “social-systems” analysis of automated systems that run on data.  
They wrote: 
 A practical and broadly applicable social-systems analysis 
thinks through all the possible effects of AI systems on all parties.  
It also engages with social impacts at every stage—conception, 
design, deployment and regulation. 
 As a first step, researchers—across a range of disciplines, gov-
ernment departments and industry—need to start investigating 
how differences in communities’ access to information, wealth 
and basic services shape the data that AI systems train on.115 
This attention to the secondary effects of the data used in AI systems 
will be an important new turn for privacy law.  The “garbage in, garbage 
out” problem of big data and automated systems can instantiate wrongful 
discrimination and have a disparate impact on minority and vulnerable pop-
ulations.116  It can subject people to a confusing, opaque system of automat-
ed decisionmaking and credit scoring that denies them due process.  These 
are the kinds of harms aimed to be remedied by anti-discrimination laws 
and civil rights.  While privacy law has always had a close relationship to 
the law designed to prevent abuses of power, it is time to make that connec-
tion much more explicit. 
Finally, privacy law must deal with the mind.  Specifically, privacy 
law should focus just as much on people’s expectations and mental models 
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by analysing aspects of AI in silos such as computer science or criminology. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing KATE CRAWFORD ET AL., THE AI NOW REPORT: THE SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE NEAR-TERM 
(2016)).  
 116.  See CLAIRE GARVIE ET AL., GEO. L. CTR. PRIVACY & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINEUP: 
UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (2016); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 6; 
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 77; Zarsky, supra note 77, at 1412; Andrew P. Selbst, Disparate 
Impact in Big Data Policing (Jan. 18, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2819182. 
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when they share their information as it does on how entities process data.  
This means focusing on the thing that shapes user expectations and use that 
has thus far been largely missing from FIPs-based privacy regimes around 
the world—the design of technologies.  In the next Section, I’ll advocate a 
turn to design for privacy law. 
B.  Privacy Law Should Focus on Design 
One of the largest problems with the FIPs is that they do not directly 
address the design of technologies.  By design, I mean the entire universe of 
people and processes that create technologies and the results of their crea-
tive process instantiated in hardware and software.  FIPs-based regimes typ-
ically speak to the processing of data, but are relatively silent about what 
the instrumentalities of data collection, use, and disclosure should look like, 
or how they are built, or how they should function.  For example, traditional 
inquiries into whether the kind of notice given to users have traditionally 
focused on the words that were used in privacy policies and terms of use.  
Design elements like fonts, graphic design, symbols, structures, or other 
contextual factors that might affect a user’s expectations are often over-
looked.  While words are an easy way to measure transparency, they do not 
tell the whole story of what shapes people’s risk assessments and under-
standing of terms when using technologies.  The FIPs are more concerned 
with data processing obligations than user expectations. 
This is a problem because there are overwhelming incentives to design 
technologies in a way that maximizes the collection, use, and disclosure of 
personal information.  Companies can profit by designing their technologies 
to marginalize users’ interests in transparency and ability to meaningfully 
control (or limit) over how their data is collected and used.  When regimes 
that are built upon the FIPs are silent about how the technologies that peo-
ple use are built, design can be leveraged in subtle ways to get more, more, 
more.  For example, symbols and icons like padlocks and seals can be used 
to make users feel like it is safe to disclose personal information online.117  
Ambiguous “privacy settings” and other semantically vague buttons like 
“add friends” can give users the wrong impression about the risks and reali-
ty of personal disclosure.118 
Privacy law should more explicitly address the design of consumer 
technologies.  A logical approach to design can answer pressing questions 
in the privacy debate.  How far can governments go in crippling privacy-
                                                          
 117.  See Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635 (2011). 
 118.  Id. at 1631–36; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Path Social Networking App Settles 
FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers and Improperly Collected Personal Information from Users’ 
Mobile Address Books (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/02/ 
path-social-networking-app-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived. 
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protective technologies like encryption?  Should surveillance technologies 
be designed to be undetectable?  What technical safeguards should compa-
nies be required to use to protect their users’ data?  What should be the lim-
its of nudging, default settings, and structured choice on social media?  In 
short, the design of technologies is probably the largest gap in privacy law.  
By addressing design, privacy regimes can go beyond the FIPs while also 
ensuring they will continue to be meaningfully implemented.119 
While design is no cure-all, it can be more effective than laws, terms 
of service, or organizational policies that restrict activity because design af-
fects every user.  People generally don’t read the terms of use and they may 
not be aware of privacy laws, but every single person that uses an app must 
reckon with the constraints of technology. 
Scholars have argued for years that design is (or at least should be) an 
important part of privacy regimes because of its power to affect human be-
havior at scale.  Twenty years ago, Professor Joel Reidenberg argued that 
fair data protection rules could be enforced through technical design mech-
anisms that co-exist with privacy policy.  He observed, “Technological ca-
pabilities and system design choices impose rules on participants.  The 
creation and implementation of information policy are embedded in net-
work designs and standards as well as in system configurations.  Even user 
preferences and technical choices create overarching, local default rules.”120  
Reidenberg proposed, “in essence, that the set of rules for information flows 
imposed by technology and communication networks form a ‘Lex Informat-
                                                          
 119.  The concept of “privacy by design” is already being robustly developed by scholars, reg-
ulators, and industry.  One such approach was pioneered by former Information and Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario, Ann Cavoukian.  See Anne Cavoukian, Privacy By Design: The 7 
Foundational Principles, https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Resources/7foundationalprin 
ciples.pdf (last visited May 17, 2017); see also COURTNEY BOWMAN ET AL., THE ARCHITECTURE 
OF PRIVACY: ON ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGIES THAT CAN DELIVER TRUSTWORTHY 
SAFEGUARDS (2015); MICHELLE FINNERAN DENNEDY ET AL., THE PRIVACY ENGINEER’S 
MANIFESTO: GETTING FROM POLICY TO CODE TO QA TO VALUE (2014); E.U. INFO. 
COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, THE GUIDE TO DATA PROTECTION (2017), https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/privacy-by-design/.  But see Lee A. Bygrave, Hardwiring 
Privacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW AND REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY (Roger 
Brownsword et al. eds., forthcoming). 
 120.  Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Lex Informat-
ica] (footnotes omitted) (first citing Larry Lessig, Reading in the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 
EMORY L.J. 869, 896–97 (1996); then citing M. Ethan Katash, Software Worlds and the First 
Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335; and then citing Joel 
R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 918, 
927–28 (1996)); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: 
Merging the Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 301–04 (1993) (arguing 
that technical considerations establish normative standards which, in turn, impact system prac-
tice); Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 508–09 (arguing that legal rules may be supplemented by tech-
nical considerations as well as business practices). 
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ica’ that policymakers must understand, consciously recognize, and encour-
age.”121 
Professor Lawrence Lessig popularized this notion that “code is law” 
in the late 1990s.  Lessig argued that architecture like software code is a 
regulatory force on people similar to laws, norms, and the market.122  Lessig 
wrote, “code presents the greatest threat to liberal or libertarian ideals, as 
well as their greatest promise.  We can build, or architect, or code cyber-
space to protect values we believe are fundamental, or we can build, or ar-
chitect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to disappear.  There is no 
middle ground.  There is no choice that does not include some kind of 
building.”123  In his chapter on privacy in his influential book Code and 
Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lessig argued in favor of technologies as a way 
to provide choices about how our information is used and shared, limit in-
formation collection, and secure our data—all notions captured by the 
FIPs.124 
Good design is proactive.  If it works, then it protects against privacy 
harms before they even happen.  Compare this to privacy law’s current fo-
cus on conduct and harm.  By definition, people have to wait until they 
have actually suffered before they can seek redress.  If given the choice, we 
should seek to keep harms from happening at all.  Even when relief is avail-
able to victims, it cannot make them “whole.”  The law strives to get as 
close as it can through money damages and injunctions, but most people 
who suffer harm would likely prefer to avoid the injury in the first place. 
Adding a proactive protection like design to privacy law will help fill 
gaps in current privacy regimes.  Design-based protections can require 
companies to protect against reasonably anticipated third-party harms.  
Technology users will not have to worry as much about hiring an attorney 
or suffering only to receive a paltry recovery because they will not become 
victims.  Design cannot do everything, but it can dissuade would-be wrong-
doers if the transaction cost is high enough. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Some of the most pressing privacy problems over the next few decades 
might have sounded like the stuff of science fiction to those who first de-
veloped the fair information practices in the 1970s.  Machines are going to 
get smarter.  They will continue to make more critical decisions that used to 
                                                          
 121.  Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, supra note 120, at 555. 
 122.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 3 (1999) [hereinafter 
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS]; Lessig, supra note 120, at 896–97; Lawrence Lessig, Law of 
the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 501–46 (1999).  
 123.  LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS, supra note 122, at 6.  
 124.  See id. at 200–32.  
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be made by humans.  The costs of these decisions will not be borne equally 
in society.  People will become vulnerable to manipulation due to their at-
tachment to robots that look and act like people and animals.  Our own fac-
es, eyes, and even ears will give away our identities, locations, and secrets.  
And, increasingly, more human interaction will be mediated by smartphone 
apps, virtual reality, and augmented reality.  The architecture of those envi-
ronments will dictate privacy outcomes every bit as much as what data con-
trollers do with their databases because design picks data winners and data 
losers.  All of these problems will amount to more than the established 
principals that demand transparency and accountability in database man-
agement can handle.  Control over personal data alone is a poor fit to save 
us from ourselves, from each other, and from the machines. 
But it would be misguided to try and marginalize the FIPs.  In addition 
to being practically difficult to do, the benefits of the FIPs are far too valua-
ble.  The global digital economy demands some harmony among privacy 
regimes.  Industry and society need to be able to find common ground on 
the boundaries of data collection and use.  The FIPs reflect a shared wisdom 
about best data practices and have been remarkably resilient. 
What is needed is a little more imagination and a willingness to admit 
that the FIPs are not the cosmos.  The answer to every privacy problem 
cannot simply be “FIP harder.”  There is room on the world stage of privacy 
regulation to consider the rules relating to competition, anti-discrimination, 
and the design of information technologies.  Recognizing the FIPs as a vital 
part, but not the whole, of privacy regimes is the only path to a sustainable 
future for privacy.  The FIPs are dead.  Long live the FIPs. 
